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STAPLETON, Circuit Judge:
The Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101
et seq., prohibits covered employers from
d i s c ri m i n at i n g a g a i n s t q u a l i f i e d
individuals on the basis of their
disabilities. Edward Raymond Williams
was unable to carry a firearm as the result
of a mental condition, and was additionally
perceived by his employer to be unable to
have access to firearms, or be around
others carrying firearms.
Granting
summary judgment in favor of the
Philadelphia Housing Authority (“PHA”),
Williams’s employer, the District Court
held that such limitations would not make
Williams significantly restricted in the
major life activity of working because they
did not prevent him from performing work
in a broad range of jobs in various classes.
Because the District Court did not consider

whether such limitations would prevent
Williams from performing work in a class
of jobs, and because a reasonable jury
could conclude that Williams was actually
(or perceived to be) precluded from
working in a class of jobs, we will now
reverse that grant of summary judgment
a n d r e m a n d W i l l ia m s ’ s A D A
discrimination claim (and corresponding
claim under the Pennsylvania Human
Relations Act) for further proceedings.
We will affirm the District Court’s
determination with respect to Williams’s
retaliation claims because Williams has
not proffered sufficient evidence to
support a retaliation claim.

postal, and having the means to do it.”
Two days after the confrontation,
PHA wrote to Williams and directed him
to report to the PHA radio room for duty.
Williams did not return to work, but
instead began to call in sick on a daily
basis. On June 25, 1998, PHA ordered
Williams to undergo a psychological
examination with its psychologist, Dr.
Lauren Finley.
The parties agree that, sometime in
June or July 1998, Williams submitted an
application for a medical leave of absence
from July 2, 1998 through August 28,
1998. The request included a “medical
certification form” completed by Helen
Huffington, M.S.S., a counselor with
Delaware County Psychological Services,
who diagnosed Williams as suffering from
“Major Depression, recurrent, severe.”
A198. PHA approved the request. On
July 29, 1998, PHA Assistant Chief Aaron
Hughes wrote to Williams regarding his
employment status. Hughes wrote, “As of
August 20, 1998, you will have exhausted
all of your sick leave and annual leave
benefits. Therefore, you will have to
request through memorandum a leave of
absence. . . . [F]ailure to do so will mean
that you have voluntarily resigned as a
member of this police department.” A197.
Williams would again be asked, on
September 22, 1998, to apply for a leave of
absence, and did so.

I. Factual and Procedural Background
A. The Facts Viewed in the Light Most
Favorable to Williams
Williams was hired by PHA as a
police officer and worked for PHA for 24
years until his termination. On May 19,
1998, shortly after arriving for an evening
shift, Williams received a page to report to
the sergeant’s office of PHA’s police
department. After being confronted by a
superior officer about his fractious
interactions with other employees,
Williams yelled and made a number of
profane and threatening remarks.
W i ll ia m s w a s
im m ediate ly
suspended without pay.
Later that
evening, he called a counselor with
Delaware County Psychological Services,
and remarked, “I understand why people
go postal.” According to a PHA police
officer who later spoke with the counselor,
Williams talked of “smoking people, going

On August 17, 1998, Williams’s
personal psychologist, Dr. Marjory Levitt,
wrote a letter to Hughes regarding
Williams. The letter stated, in pertinent
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part:

that Sgt. Williams should
not resume active duty,
involving his usual and
normal work activities,
unless he is under the proper
care of me dic a l an d
psychological personnel.
He requires psychological
treatment for depression and
stress management. He also
requires an evaluation by
m e d i c a l p e r s o n n el to
determine if he may be
further helped
by
psychotropic medications.
Sgt. Williams can resume
working on alternate work
assignments and should do
so for a minimum period of
3 months in order to provide
an initial opportunity for
him to begin receiving
bene fits f r o m regu lar
medicinal
and/or
psychological treatment. He
should be reevaluated after
this time in order to
determine whether or not he
can resume active duty with
t h e conti n u a t i o n of
p r e s c r ib e d t r e a tm e n t
regiment
for
the
management of his stress
and depression.

Sgt. Edward R.
Williams, Sr., has requested
that I write to you and report
on his readiness to return to
full ti m e e m p lo ym ent
beginning August 20, 1998.
Sgt. Williams states
that he is fully prepared
p h y s i c a l l y
a n d
psychologically to resume
his professional duties. He
assures me that he is
emotionally stable and able
to perform reliably and
fulfill his responsibilities.
He is not taking any
psychotropic medications
and denies other substance
use, with the exception of a
medication for hypertension.
He has not been evaluated
by a psychiatrist, nor has he
been in regular individual
outpatient treatment. He
does request that his contact
with [the PHA superior
officer Williams confronted
on May 19, 1998] be as
limited as possible.
A199.
In August and September 1998,
Williams attended three appointments with
Dr. Finley, PHA’s psychologist.
On
September 21, 1998, Dr. Finley shared her
evaluation of Williams’s fitness for duty:

Sgt. Williams [sic]
condition appears to be
exacerbated by considerable
tension between himself and
one of his superiors. . . . It

It is my professional opinion
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could be helpful if
t h e d i f f iculties
between them could
be mediated or if the
amount of contact
between the two was
greatly reduced.

pending a reevaluation.

A201.
On October 13, 1998, after Dr.
Finley had cleared Williams for restricted
duty, Williams requested that PHA
temporarily reassign him to work in the
PHA training unit. Hughes responded:

A200. Upon receipt of the Finley letter,
PHA requested clarification of Dr.
Finley’s findings, to which Dr. Finley
responded on October 10, 1998:

[I]t is the position of this
police department that the
specific position that you are
requesting is not open to
you due to your on-going
treatment with Dr. Lauren
Finley . . . and her
recommendation that you
should not carry a weapon
while still under her care for
the next several months.
This department has also
concluded that once you
have completed all of your
treatment with Dr. Finley,
releasing you to return to
full duty, with authorization
to carry firearms once again,
you are to report back to
uniform patrol duty.

First, I have been called
upon by human resources to
provide a con sultative
evaluation for [Sergeant]
Edward Williams. I have
not nor will I be working
with [Sergeant] Williams on
an ongoing basis. Second,
Mr. Williams is fully
capable of working, for a
temporary period, in either
an administrative and/or
clerical capacity. He should
n o t carry a w eapon ,
however, for a minimum
period of three months. He
can work around other
officers who will be wearing
their weapon. Third, it [is]
anticipated that [Sergeant]
Williams will be able to
fully return to active duty,
resuming his usual job
responsibilities after this
approximate three month
period. However, a more
definite time frame cannot
be provided at this time,

A204.
One day later, Williams wrote to
Hughes requesting an assignment “in the
[PHA] radio room until [his] 3 month
evaluation [was] over. . . .” PHA did not
respond to that request until this litigation
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ensued.1

evidence and apply for a
medical leave of absence.
This information and your
formal written request
should be received by my
o f f i c e n o l a t er t h an
December 18, 1998. Failure
to do so will result in PHA
terminating
your
employment as of that date.

On November 19, 1998, Deputy
Chief of Police Ricks wrote an internal
memorandum to Carl Marinelli, Assistant
General Manager for Human Resources,
regarding Williams’s employment status.
Wrote Ricks, “Williams has exhausted all
of his leave time and should apply for a
medical leave of absence. If he does not
apply for a medical leave of absence by
November 30, 1998, it is the position of
this department that Human Resources
terminate Edward Williams according to
PHA personnel policy regarding medical
leave.” A863.

A206. Williams did not contact Marinelli
regarding an application for medical leave
and did not respond to the letter.
On December 29, 1998, Marinelli
sent a letter to Williams notifying him that
he was being terminated.

On December 3, 1998, Marinelli
wrote to Williams requesting that he file
for medical leave.

In my letter to you
dated December 3, 1998 I
asked that you request a
medical leave of absence
and submit that request
along with sup porti ng
medical evidence to me no
later than December 18,
1998.
As you have
submitted neither, I am
notifying you of your
t e rmina tio n f r o m t h e
Philad elphia H ousing
Authority effective August
28, 1998. Please call . . . to
discuss your termination
benefits.

As you know, you have
exhausted all leave time
available as a police Officer
with the P hiladelphia
Housing Authority. It is
now necessary that you
obtain the required medical

1

The record is unclear as to whether
PHA responded to this request, but we
assume for summary judgment purposes
that PHA did not respond to the radio
room request. In the context of this
litigation, an affidavit from a PHA Police
Department Administrator, John O’Brien,
indicated that “[i]nstead of placing Sgt.
Williams in the radio room, PHA offered
him a leave of absence that would have
allowed him to return to work as a police
sergeant within 90 days.” A202.

A249.
B. Procedural Background
Williams filed a complaint against
PHA in the United States District Court for
5

the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
asserting several causes of action. After
the District Court ruled on PHA’s motion
to dismiss and motion for judgment on the
pleadings, on ly c l ai m s assertin g
discrimination under the ADA and
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act
(“PHRA”) remained.
Ultimately, the
District Court granted PHA’s motion for
summary judgment on those remaining
claims.
Williams timely moved for
reconsideration of that order. The District
Court denied that motion, and Williams
filed a timely notice of appeal.

III. The Retaliation Claim
The ADA provides: “No person
shall discriminate against any individual
because such individual has opposed any
act or practice made unlawful by [the
ADA] or because such individual made a
charge . . . under [the ADA].” 42 U.S.C. §
12203(a). “Thus, it is unlawful for an
employer to retaliate against an employee
based upon the employee’s opposition to
anything that is unlawful under the ADA.”
Shellenberger v. Summit Bancorp, Inc.,
318 F.3d 183, 188 (3d Cir. 2003).
“[I]n order to establish a prima
facie case of illegal retaliation under the
anti-discrimination statutes, a plaintiff
must show: ‘(1) protected employee
activity; (2) adverse action by the
employer either after or contemporaneous
with the employee’s protected activity; and
(3) a causal connection between the
employee’s protected activity and the
employer’s adverse action.’” Fogleman v.
Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 567-68
(3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Krouse v. Am.
Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir.
1997)). Williams argues on appeal that
PHA terminated him in retaliation for his
request for reassignment to PHA’s radio
room as a reasonable accommodation.2

II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
The District Court had federal
question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1331 with respect to Williams’s ADA
claims, and supplemental jurisdiction over
Williams’s PHRA claims under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367. This Court has final order
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to
review the District Court’s denial of
reconsideration, which here ended the
proceedings in that Court. See Sheehan v.
Beyer, 51 F.3d 1170, 1174 (3d Cir. 1995).
We review the District Court’s
grant of summary judgment to PHA using
the same standard that the District Court
applied. Omnipoint Comm. Enter., L.P. v.
Newton Township, 219 F.3d 240, 242 (3d
Cir. 2000). “Summary judgment is proper
if there is no genuine issue of material fact
and if, viewing the facts in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Carter v. McGrady, 292
F.3d 152, 157 (3d Cir. 2002).

2

Unlike a claim for discrimination
under the ADA, an ADA retaliation claim
based upon an employee having requested
an accommodation does not require that a
plaintiff show that he or she is “disabled”
within the meaning of the ADA. “The
right to request an accommodation in good
6

Applying the McDonnell Douglas
framework,3 the District Court assumed

arguendo that Williams could make out a
prima facie showing of retaliation. The
Court then noted that PHA had put forth a
legitimate reason for terminating Williams:
Williams had exhausted all available leave
time to which he was entitled and failed to
request a leave of absence or otherwise
contact PHA in response to Carl
Marinelli’s December 3, 1998, letter.
Upon shifting the burden back to the

faith is no less a guarantee under the ADA
than the right to file a complaint with the
EEOC, and we have already explained that
the ADA protects one who engages in the
latter activity without regard to whether
t h e c o m p l a i n a n t i s ‘ d i s a b le d .’ ”
Shellenberger, 318 F.3d at 191. Thus, as
opposed to showing disability, a plaintiff
need only show that she had a reasonable,
good faith belief that she was entitled to
request the reasonable accommodation she
requested. See id.

opportunity to prove by a
pr e ponder a n c e of th e
evidence that the legitimate
reasons offered by the
defendant were not its true
reasons, but were a pretext
for discrimination. See Tex.
Dep’t of Community Affairs
v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,
252-53, 101 S.Ct. 1089,
1093, 67 L.Ed.2d 207
(1981) (citations omitted).
Wh ile the burden of
production may shift, “[t]he
ultimate burden of
persuading the trier of fact
that the defendant
intentionally discriminated
against the plaintiff remains
at all times with the
plaintiff.”
Id.
Our
experience is that most
cases turn on the third stage,
i.e., can the pla intiff
establish pretext.
Id. at 500-01 (quoting Jones v. School
Dist. of Phila., 198 F.3d 403, 410 (3d Cir.
1999)) (alterations in original).

3

The burden-shifting framework of
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792 (1973) applies to ADA retaliation
claims. See Shaner v. Synthes, 204 F.3d
494, 500 (3d Cir. 2000).
Briefly summarized, the
McDonnell Douglas
analysis proceeds in three
stages. First, the plaintiff
must establish a prima facie
case of discrimination. If
the plaintiff succeeds in
establishing a prima facie
case, the burden shifts to the
defendant “to articulate
some
legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason
f o r t h e e m p lo y e e ’s
rejection.”
[McDonnell
Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802,
93 S.Ct. at 1824.] Finally,
should the defendant carry
this burden, the plaintiff
then must have an
7

plaintiff, the District Court found that he
presented “very little in the way of
e v i d e n c e showing ‘weak n e s s e s,
i m p l a u s i b i l i ti e s , i n c o n s i s te n c i e s ,
incoherencies, or contradictions in the
employer’s proffered legitimate reasons
for its action.’” Dist. Court Op. at 18
(quoting Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759,
765 (3d Cir. 1994)). In addition, the Court
held that the timing of W illiams’s
termination on December 29, 1998,
occurring over two months after the
request for an accommodation on October
21, 1998, was not suggestive of a causal
connection between Williams’s request for
an accommodation and termination. The
Court concluded that the summary
judgment record would not support a
finding that PHA’s explanation for the
termination was pretextual. W e agree.

two days between the protected activity
engaged in and the alleged retaliation
sufficed in Jalil v. Avdel Corp., 873 F.2d
701, 708 (3d Cir.1989), to support an
inference of a causal connection between
the two. Similarly, in Shellenberger,
commen ts made by a supervisor
suggesting retaliation ten days before
termination, along with other evidence of
retaliation, were sufficient to establish a
prima facie showing of causation.
Shellenberger, 318 F.3d at 189.
Here, over two months elapsed
between the time Williams requested a
radio room assignment and the time that he
was terminated. In cases like this one,
“where ‘the temporal proximity is not so
close as to be unduly suggestive,’ we have
recognized that ‘timing plus other
evidence may be an appropriate test. . . .’”
Thomas v. Town of Hammonton, 351 F.3d
108, 114 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Estate of
Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 513 (3d
Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks
omitted)). 4 Williams has, however, put

In support of his retaliation claim,
Williams relies primarily on the temporal
proximity between his October 21, 1998,
request for an accommodation and his
December 29, 1998, termination. We have
held in the ADA retaliation context that
“temporal proximity between the protected
activity and the termination [can be itself]
sufficient to establish a causal link.”
Shellenberger, 318 F.3d at 183 (quoting
Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d
913, 920 (3d Cir.1997)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). However, “the timing of
the alleged retaliatory action must be
unusually suggestive of retaliatory motive
before a causal link will be inferred.”
Shellenberger, 318 F.3d at 189 n.9
(quoting Krouse, 126 F.3d at 503) (internal
quotation marks omitted). For example,

4

Williams argues that the retaliatory
action in this case occurred not on the date
that he was terminated, but on November
19, 1998—the day an internal PHA memo
directed Marinelli to write to Williams and
demand that he apply for medical leave or
be terminated. The memo indicated that
“it is the position of this department that
Human Resources terminate Edward
Williams according to PHA personnel
policy regarding medical leave” if
Williams “does not apply for a medical
leave of absence by November 30, 1998.”
8

forth no other evidence suggesting that
PHA terminated him because he requested
a radio room assignment. M oreover, the
evidence supporting PHA’s alternative
explanation is quite compelling.
As
Williams acknowledges, PHA had granted
Williams medical leave on two prior
occasions, and there was no indication that
PHA would not have done so again had
Williams simply contacted Marinelli, as
the letter requested.5 Nor is there any

dispute that, absent an application and
s u p p o rt i n g m e d i c a l c er t if i c a ti o n,
termination was the only option available
to PHA under the relevant, consistently
applied policy.
Because Williams has failed to
proffer any evidence of retaliation other
than the not unduly suggestive temporal
relationship between his request for an
accommodation and his termination, we
must agree with the District Court that “no
reasonable jury could conclude that the
two events shared a causal link” for
purposes of an ADA retaliation claim.
Dist. Court Op. at 22.

A510. Even assuming arguendo that
November 19, 1998, were the date of
retaliatory action in this case, our
classification of this case as one “where
the temporal proximity is not so close as to
be unduly suggestive” would remain the
same.

IV. The Discrimination Claim
Section 12112(a) of Title 42,
United States Code, provides that:
No covered entity shall
discriminate again st a
qualified individual with a
disability because of the
disability of such individual
in regard to job application
procedures, the hiring,
advancement, or discharge
of employees, employee
compensation, job training,
and other terms, conditions,
and
privileges of

5

Williams hypothetically suggests in his
brief that, although he was aware of
PHA’s general policy on leaves of
absences and PHA’s ability to grant a
leave of absence for any reason, “perhaps”
Marinelli’s request in the December 3,
1998, letter to obtain the “required medical
evidence” led him to believe that a leave
of absence would now only be available to
him upon providing that evidence. He
then argues in his brief that, if he held such
a belief, he would have also thought that it
would be impossible to obtain such
evidence because he was capable of
working and PHA’s own expert had
cleared him for restricted work.
There is, however, no record
support for such an argument. “[W]e have
repeatedly held that unsubstantiated
arguments made in briefs or at oral

argument are not evidence to be
considered by this Court.” Versarge v.
Township of Clinton N.J., 984 F.2d 1359,
1370 (3d Cir. 1993). Williams has not
cited to any record evidence indicating that
he held such a belief.
9

employment.

this context include refusing to make
reaso nable accommodations for a
plaintiff’s disabilities.
The ADA
specifically provides that an employer
“discriminates” against a qualified
individual with a disability when the
employer does “‘not mak[e] reasonable
accommodations to the known physical or
mental limitations of the individual unless
the [employer] can demonstrate that the
accommodation would impose an undue
hardship on the operation of the business
of the [employer].’” Taylor, 184 F.3d at
306 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A))
(alterations in original). “Reasonable
accommodation” further “includes the
employer’s reasonable efforts to assist the
employee and to communicate with the
employee in good faith,” Mengine v.
Runyon, 114 F.3d 415, 416 (3d Cir. 1997),
under what has been termed a duty to
engage in the “interactive process,” which
we will discuss in detail infra.

Id.6
A “qualified individual with a
disability” is defined by the ADA as a
person “with a disability who, with or
without reasonable accommodation, can
perform the essential functions of the
employment position that such individual
holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
To establish a prima facie case of
discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff
must therefore show “(1) he is a disabled
person within the meaning of the ADA; (2)
he is otherwise qualified to perform the
essential functions of the job, with or
without reasonable accommodations by the
employer; and (3) he has suffered an
otherwise adverse employment decision as
a result of discrimination.” Taylor, 184
F.3d at 306 (quoting Gaul v. Lucent
Technologies, 134 F.3d 576, 580 (3d
Cir.1998) (citing Shiring v. Runyon, 90
F.3d 827, 831 (3d Cir.1996))) (internal
quotation marks omitted).

Williams alleges that PHA
discriminated against him by (1) failing to
p r o v i d e f o r t h e re a s o n a b le
accommodations that he requested and (2)
breaching its duty to engage in the
interactive process by not responding in
good faith to his requests for
accommodations. The District Court held,
inter alia, that Williams was not
“disabled” within the meaning of the ADA
and therefore could not make a prima facie
showing of disability discrimination. We
now review de novo whether Williams
made such a showing.

Adverse employment decisions in

6

Williams has also brought his
disability discrimination claim under the
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act
(“PHRA”). An “analysis of an ADA claim
applies equally to a PHRA claim.” Taylor
v. Phoenixville School Dist., 184 F.3d 296,
306 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing Kelly v. Drexel
Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 105 (3d Cir. 1996)).
Accordingly, we will only discuss
Williams’s ADA claim because our
analysis of that claim is, under the
circumstances of this case, coterminous
with the PHRA claim.

A. Disability

10

A “disability” is defined by the
ADA as: “(A) a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or
more of the major life activities of [an]
individual; (B) a record of such an
impairment; or (C) being regarded as
having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. §
12102(2). Williams asserts that he met the
criteria for disability under § 12102(2)(A)
(“actual disability”) because he had “a
physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the
major life activities,” in that his mental
condition prevented him from carrying
firearms. Williams further asserts that he
met the criteria for disability under §
12102(2)(C) (“regarded as disabled”)
because his employer, PHA, wrongly
perceived him to be disabled when it
treated him as unable to work with, have
access to, or be around others carrying,
firearms.

“substantially limited” in performing a
major life activity if the individual is
(i) Unable to perform a
major life activity that the
average person in the
general population can
perform; or (ii) Significantly
r e s t r ic t e d a s t o th e
c o n d i t io n , m a nne r o r
duration under which an
individual can perform a
particular major life activity
as comp ared to th e
condition, m ann er, o r
duration under which the
average person in the
general population can

While there is some question as to the
level of deference EEOC regulations
interpreting definitional terms of the ADA
are entitled to after the Supreme Court’s
decision in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
527 U.S. 471 (1999), neither of the parties
challenges the reasonableness of the
EEOC’s regulations with respect to the
term “disability.” See Toyota Motor Mfg.,
Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 194
(2002) (“[N]o agency has been given
authority to issue regulations interpreting
the term ‘disability’ in the ADA.
Nonetheless, the EEOC has done so. See
29 CFR §§ 1630.2(g)-(j) (2001). Because
both parties accept the EEOC regulations
as reasonable, we assume without deciding
that they are, and we have no occasion to
decide what level of deference, if any, they
are due.”) (citing Sutton, 527 U.S. at 47980).

i. Actual Disability
With respect to determining
whether an individual is actually disabled
within the meaning of the ADA, EEOC
Regulations 7 provide that an individual is

7

“Because the ADA does not define
many of the pertinent terms, we are guided
by the Regulations issued by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission
(‘EEOC’) to implement Title I of the Act.
See 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (requiring the
EEOC to implement said Regulations); 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2.” Deane v. Pocono
Medical Center, 142 F.3d 138, 143 n.4 (3d
Cir. 1998) (en banc) (citations omitted).
11

perform that same
major life activity.

activity of working:
(A) The geographical area
to which the individual has
reasonable access;

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1). Several factors
are to be considered in evaluating whether
an individual is substantially limited in a
major life activity: “(i) The nature and
severity of the impairment; (ii) The
duration or expected duration of the
impairment; and (iii) The permanent or
long term impact, or the expected
permanent or long term impact of or
resulting from the impairment.” Id. §
1630.2(j)(2).

(B) The job from which the
i n d i v id u a l h a s b e e n
disqualified because of an
impairment, and the number
and types of jobs utilizing
similar training, knowledge,
skills or abilities, within that
geographical area, from
which the individual is also
disqualified because of the
impairment (class of jobs);
and/or

Williams contends that his inability
to carry a firearm substantially limited him
in the major life activity of “working.”
The EEOC regulations provide that, in
determining whether an individual is
restricted in the major life activity of
working,

(C) The job from which the
i n d i v id u a l h a s b e e n
disqualified because of an
impairment, and the number
and types of other jobs not
utilizing similar training,
knowledge, skills or
abilities, within that
geographical area, from
which the individual is also
disqualified because of the
impairment (broad range of
jobs in various classes).

[t]he term ‘substantially
limits’ means significantly
restricted in the ability to
perform either a class of
jobs or a broad range of jobs
in various classes as
compared to the average
person having comparable
training, skills and abilities.
The inability to perform a
single, particular job does
not constitute a substantial
limitation in the major life
activity of working.

Id. §1630.2(j)(3)(ii).
Summarizing these regulations, the
Supreme Court has held that
[t]o be substantially limited
in the major life activity of
working, then, one must be
precluded from more than
o n e t ype o f job , a

Id. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i). Several specific
additional factors are to be considered in
determining whether an individual is
substantially limited in the major life
12

specialized job, or a
particular job of
choice.
If jobs
utilizing
an
individual’s skills
(but perhaps not his
or her unique talents)
are available, one is
not precluded from a
substantial class of
jobs. Similarly, if a
host of different
types of jobs are
available, one is not
precluded from a
broad range of jobs.

thereby not precluding him from
performing work in a broad range of jobs.
We agree with the District Court
that Williams’s testimony establishes that
he was not precluded from a “broad range
of jobs” within the meaning of 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(C).
Ho wever, the
r e gula tions prov ide th a t one is
substantially limited in the major life
activity of working if one is significantly
restricted in one’s ability to perform
“either a class of jobs or a broad range of
jobs.”
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i)
(emphasis added). It is clear from the
regulations that, even if one has the ability
to perform a broad range of jobs, one is
nevertheless disabled if one is significantly
restricted in one’s ability to perform most
of the jobs in one’s geographical area that
utilize training, knowledge, skills and
abilities similar to the job one has been
disqualified from performing.
The
EEOC’s Technical Assistance Manual, for
example, refers to the following scenario
as an example of being significantly
restricted in one’s ability to perform a
“class of jobs:”

Sutton, 527 U.S. at 493. The question of
whether an individual is substantially
limited in a major life activity is a question
of fact. See Gagliardo v. Connaught Lab.,
Inc., 311 F.3d 565, 569 (3d Cir. 2002).
The District Court, viewing
Williams’s actual limitation (i.e., his
inability to carry a firearm resulting from
his severe depression) as one that
“temporarily limit[ed] the jobs that were
available to [him] to those jobs that do not
require him to carry a firearm,” Dist. Court
Op. at 29, held that Williams was not
precluded from performing a broad range
of jobs, and therefore was not disabled
within the meaning of the ADA. The
District Court noted that Williams had
testified at a deposition that he could have
performed the duties of a bus driver,
chauffeur, and tow truck operator, and
could have worked for the public
transportation agency SEPTA, a rental car
agency, or in the radio room at PHA,

A computer programmer
develops a vision
impairment that does not
substantially limit her ability
to see, but because of poor
contrast is unable to
distinguish print on
computer screens.
Her
impairment prevents her
from working as a computer
o p e r a tor , p ro g ra m m er ,
instructor, or systems
13

analyst.
She is
substantially limited
in working, because
her im pairment
prevents her from
working in the class
of jobs requiring use
of a computer.

assignment available in the PHA police
department that did not require the use of
a firearm was work in the PHA radio
room.” A202. Moreover, PHA has not
challenged, for summary judgment
purposes, that Williams was incapable of
working in most law enforcement
positions due to his inability to carry a gun.
Instead, PHA argues that (1) “law
enforcement” cannot constitute a “class”
of jobs, and (2) Williams’s inability to
work with firearms was, in fact, temporary
and, accordingly, not a “significant
restriction.”

Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, A Technical Assistance
Manual on the Employment Provisions
(Title I) of the Americans with Disabilities
Act II-7 (Jan. 1992) (“Technical Assistance
Manual”).

PHA does not explain why law
enforcement positions are not a “class of
jobs” within the meaning of that phrase as
used in the EEOC’s regulations, and our
reading of those regulations persuades us
that the record would support a finding in
favor of Williams on this issue. For
example, assuming the jury were
convinced that Williams’s condition
substantially restricts his ability to perform
law enforcement jobs, it seems to us that
Williams would be no less limited in the
major life activity of working than the
computer programmer referenced by the
EEOC as being “substantially limited in
working, because her impairment prevents
her from working in the class of jobs
requiring use of a computer.” Technical
Assistance Manual at II-7.

The District Court did not address
whether Williams was significantly
restricted in his ability to perform a class
of jobs because of his depression and the
resulting inability to carry a firearm. A
critical question was thus left unanswered:
Compared to an average person living in
the same geographical region as Williams
with similar training, knowledge, skills,
and abilities, was Williams substantially
restricted in his ability to perform jobs in
law enforcement? We conclude that the
record would permit a reasonable jury to
conclude that he was.
Williams contends that his inability
to carry a firearm precludes him from
serving in most law enforcement jobs
w h e r e v e r l o c a te d a n d t h e re f o re
significantly restricts his ability to perform
that class of jobs. While the record has not
been fully developed on this issue, it does
su p p o r t t h a t co n t e nt io n .
P HA
administrator John O’Brien testified in an
affidavit that “[a]s of 1998, the only job

We reject the PHA’s suggestion
that Sutton teaches to the contrary. In
Sutton, a group of myopic job applicants
challenged an airline’s minimum vision
requirement for the job of “global airline
pilot.” The Supreme Court noted that this
14

position, global airline pilot, was a “single
job” (and, in fact, was a position with one
single employer), and did not preclude the
group from pursuing “a number of other
positions utilizing petitioners’ skills, such
as regional pilot and pilot instructor to
name a few, [that] are available to them.”
Sutton, 527 U.S. at 493. The Court noted
that under the Interpretative Guidance
provided by the EEOC, “an individual who
cannot be a commercial airline pilot
because of a minor vision impairment, but
who can be a commercial airline co-pilot
or a pilot for a courier service, would not
be substantially limited in the major life
activity of working.” Id.

appendicitis, and in fluen za, being
impairments of a temporary nature “with
little or no long term or permanent
impact,” cannot as a matter of law
substantially limit an individual in a major
life activity. See EEOC Interpretive
Guidance, 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. §
1630.2(j). However, Williams does not
need to show that his disability is
permanent; instead, under the EEOC
regulations, the “nature and severity” of
Williams’s impairment and its “duration or
expected duration,” along with the
“permanent or long term impact” of that
impairment, are factors to be considered in
determining whether an individual is
substantially limited in a major life
activity.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2).
Because an impairment and its impact may
be less than permanent and still
“significantly restrict” a person’s ability to
perform a class of jobs, the current record
precludes summary judgment based on this
issue.

In Sutton, petitioners could not be
one type of pilot working for one
particular employer, but could hold various
other pilot jobs. Williams, on the other
hand, could not work in most law
enforcement positions so long as his
condition persisted.
With respect to the expected
duration of Williams’s impairment, the
record is not fully developed, but we
conclude that there is enough evidence to
permit resolution of the issue in Williams’s
favor. As a matter of law, a “transient,
nonpermanent condition,” McDonald v.
Commonwealth, 62 F.3d 92, 94-97 (3d Cir.
1995), or “a temporary, non-chronic
impairment of short duration,” Rinehimer
v. Cemcolift, Inc., 292 F.3d 375, 380 (3d
Cir. 2002), it is true, fall short of
substantially limiting an individual in a
major life activity. Accordingly, the
EEOC has suggested, for example, that
broken limbs, sprained joints, concussions,

Williams’s medical record reflects
that he was professionally diagnosed with
“Major Depressive Disorder” as early as
December of 1996, and that he was under
continuing treatment for depression in the
fall of 1999, more than a year after his
termination. Examining clinicians on both
sides agreed that, during the time in which
Williams first took leave from PHA in the
summer of 1998, Williams suffered from
depression that required treatment over at
least an indefinite period of time. Dr.
Finley, PHA’s psychologist, concluded
that Williams “require[d] psychological
treatment for depression and stress
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management,” A200, and indicated that his
condition was severe enough to prevent
him from carrying a firearm. Dr. Finley
did not express an opinion as to the
duration of Williams’s impairment, but
suggested that he might be “further helped
by psychotropic medications,” although
further evaluation would be necessary to
determine whether or not he could “resume
active duty with the continuation of
p r e s c ri b e d t re a t m e n t .”
A 200.
Reevaluation after a period of three
months would be required to provide a
“more definite time frame” for his full
return to active duty. A201. Helen
Huffington, M.S.S., Williams’s treating
counselor at Delawa re C ounty
Psychological Services, indicated that
W i l l ia m s s u f f e r e d f r o m “ m a j o r
depression,” and further concluded that his
condition was “recurrent [and] severe,”
A198, thereby suggesting that Williams’s
mental impairment was severe, would have
a long-term impact, and was likely to
persist. Williams’s personal psychologist,
Dr. Levitt, reached the same conclusion as
Huffington, diagnosing Williams as
suffering from recurrent and severe major
depression. A519.

Moreover, given in this case the history of
the disorder, the lack of such assurance,
and the conclusions of Williams’s treating

not resume active duty,
involving his usual and
normal work activities,
unless he is under the proper
care of me dic a l an d
psychological personnel.
He requires psychological
treatment for depression and
stress management. He also
requires an evaluation by
m e d ic a l p e rsonn el to
determine if he may be
further helped by
psychotropic medications.
Sgt. Williams can resume
working on alternate work
assignments and should do
so for a minimum period of
3 months in order to provide
an initial opportunity for
him to begin receiving
benefits f ro m regula r
medicinal
and/or
psychological treatment. He
should be reevaluated after
this time in order to
determine whether or not he
can resume active duty with
the continua tion of
p r e s c r i b e d t r e a tm e n t
regiment
for
the
management of his stress
and depression.

While Dr. Finley hoped that
treatment would improve Williams’s
condition in the future, there was certainly
no assurance that such would be the case.8

8

As we have noted, Dr. Finley wrote, in
part, as follows:
It is my professional opinion
that Sgt. Williams should

A200 (emphasis added).
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clinicians that his major depression was
severe and recurrent, a reasonable jury
could conclude that Williams’s problem
was not a temporary one, and would not be
precluded from reaching a finding of
actual disability.

“A person is ‘regarded as’ having a
disability” if the person:
(1) Has a physical or mental
impairment that does not
substantially limit major life
activities but is treated by
the covered entity as
constituting such limitation;

ii. “Regarded As” Disabled
While Dr. Finley, PHA’s examining
clinician, indicated that Williams was only
limited in his ability to carry a firearm, the
record is clear that PHA perceived
Williams as being unable to have access to
firearms and to be around others carrying
firearms. As PHA Administrator O’Brien
has testified,

(2) Has a physical or mental
impairment
that
substantially limits major
life activities only as a result
of the attitudes of others
toward such impairment; or
(3)Has
[no
such
impairment] but is treated
by a covered entity as
having a substantially
limiting impairment.

[a]t all relevant times, PHA
assigned armed po lice
officers to work in the PHA
radio room.
Anyone
assigned to the radio room
would have access to
firearms. . . . PHA did not
assign Sergeant Williams to
he radio room . . . because. .
. Sgt. Williams would have
access to firearms in the
radio room.

Taylor v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d
180, 188 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(l)). Here, Williams argues that
PHA regarded him as having a limitation
(i.e., the inability to have access to or be

Williams’s actual disability, which we will
discuss infra with respect to whether
Williams could have been accommodated.
If PHA’s perception was, in fact, accurate,
a jury could still determine that Williams
was disabled, but these additional
limitations (i.e., that he not have access to
firearms or be around others carrying
firearms) might prevent him from being a
qualified individual, in that there may have
been no way to accommodate such an
individual at this employer police station.

A202 (emphasis added). Williams argues
that PHA wrongly perceived him as having
these additional limitations, and thereby
regarded him as being disabled.9

9

In light of Dr. Finley’s conclusion that
Williams could be around others carrying
firearms, there is, of course, a factual issue
to be determined as to whether PHA’s
perception was accurate and reflected
17

around others carrying firearms) far
greater than the actual limitation (i.e., the
inability to carry a firearm) that resulted
from his mental impairment. 10

temporarily disabled for “90 days,” even if
his actual limitation was not temporary. In
support of that proposition, PHA first
suggests that Dr. Finley’s reports would
require a jury to conclude that PHA
regarded Williams as disabled only for 90
days. While PHA heavily relies upon Dr.
Finley’s reports as the basis for its view of
Williams’s impairments, Dr. Finley’s
reports, as we have noted, indicate that it
was not possible to provide “a more
definite time frame . . . at this time [as to
when Williams could carry a firearm],
pending a reevaluation.”
A201.
A
reasonable juror could find that Dr.
Finley’s reports, as relied upon by PHA,
establish that PHA viewed Williams as
requiring ongoing treatment, and that PHA
did not believe that a return to full duty
was imminent.

We determined previously that a
trier of fact could find Williams to be
actually disabled based on the evidence
suggesting that Williams’s inability to
carry a firearm significantly restricted his
ability to perform law enforcement jobs.
The additional limitations perceived by
PHA, of course, only serve to further
restrict the jobs Williams could perform in
law enforcement. As Williams suggests,
an inability to have access to or be around
others carrying firearms would prevent
him from serving in virtually all law
enforcement positions.
Williams has
therefore sufficiently demonstrated that a
trier of fact could determine that PHA
regarded him as being substantially limited
in the major life activity of working
because of its perception that he could not
hold any law enforcement position.

PHA further looks to a memo from
Assistant Chief of Operations Aaron
Hughes to Williams dated October 20,
1998, in which Hughes indicated that
“once you [Williams] have completed all
of your treatment with Dr. Finley,
releasing you to return to full duty, with
authorization to carry firearms once again,
you are to report back to uniform patrol
duty.”
A 204 (the “Hughes
mem orandum”).
The Hughes
memorandum required W illiams to
complete “all” of his treatment with Dr.
Finley and receive her authorization to
carry firearms before being allowed to
return to “patrol duty.” That memorandum
was written ten days after Dr. Finley
informed PHA that she had not been asked
to treat Williams and would not “be

PHA argues, however, that
Williams’s “regarded as” disability claim
must fail because it regarded him as

10

Williams’s position, that he was both
actually disabled and wrongly regarded as
d i s a b l e d , i s “ [n o t ] i n t r i n s i c a l l y
contradictory, as he could have an
impairment (whether or not it rose to the
level of a disability) that could actually be
accommodated, despite [his employer’s]
perception that his disability was too
severe to accommodate.” Pathmark, 177
F.3d at 189.
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working with [Sergeant] Williams on an
ongoing basis.” A160. Given that PHA
had been informed by Dr. Finley that no
such treatment with her was planned, it is
difficult to see how a reasonable juror,
reading the Hughes memorandum and its
requirement that Williams receiv e
treatment from Dr. Finley, would have to
conclude that PHA was determined to
allow Williams to return to work in 90
days.
Moreover, in light of the
memorandum’s requirement that Williams
receive medical clearance to carry firearms
before returning to PHA, a reasonable
juror could determine that PHA perceived
Williams’s impairment to be of an
unknown and potentially unlimited
determination.11

We thus conclude that there is a
material dispute of fact both as to whether
Williams was actually disabled in the
summer of 1998 and as to whether he was
regarded by PHA as being disabled.
B. Qualified Status
The second element of Williams’s
prima facie case of discrimination under
the ADA requires him to show that he is a
“qualified individual.” See Deane, 142
F.3d at 145. As previously noted, a
qualified individual is one “who, with or
without reasonable accommodation, can
perform the essential functions of the
employment position that such individual
holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
“[A] disabled employee may establish a
prima facie case under the ADA if s/he
shows that s/he can perform the essential
functions of the job with reasonable
accommodation and that the employer
refused to make such an accommodation.”
Skerski v. Time Warner Cable Co., 257
F.3d 273, 284 (3d Cir. 2001).

11

PHA further relies upon an affidavit
submitted by PHA Administrator O’Brien
indicating that PHA offered Williams a
“leave of absence that would have allowed
him to return to work as a police sergeant
within 90 days.” A202. This would
apparently be the basis for PHA’s
argument that they perceived Williams as
able to return to work in 90 days.
However, the affidavit conflicts on its face
with the Hughes memorandum, which
indicated that Williams would only be
allowed to return to work upon completion
of treatment w ith the employer’s
psychologist–treatment that the employer’s
psychologist never agreed to perform–and
upon receiving clearance from the
employer’s psychologist to carry firearms.
While a jury might believe O’Brien’s
testimony, the record certainly does not

Under the ADA, a “reasonable
accommodation” includes “reassignment
to a vacant position.” 42 U.S.C. §
12111(9)(B).
However, the EEOC’s
commentary to its regulations provides that
reassignment “should be considered only
when accommo dati on w ithin th e
individual’s current position would pose
an undue hardship.” EEOC Interpretive
Guidance, 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. §
1630.2(o). Neither party has suggested
that any accommodation within Williams’s

compel such a conclusion.
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current position would have been possible
in this case.

PHA insists, however, that
Williams was not qualified to work in the
radio room because he was not only unable
to carry a firearm, but was, in fact, also
unable to have access to firearms or be
around others who carried firearms.
Concededly, a radio room assignment
would have allowed Williams to have
access to firearms or to be around others
who carried firearms. This argument
cannot succeed at the summary judgment
stage, however, because PHA’s own
doctor’s report supports the view that
Williams’s condition did not preclude him
from working with people who carried
weapons.
Dr. Finley specifically
concluded that Williams “can work around
other officers who will be wearing their
weapon.” A201. A reasonable jury could
thus conclude that Williams’s actual
limitations left him qualified to do radio
room work.12

Williams first asked to be
reassigned to PHA’s training unit. PHA
responded to Williams: “the specific
position that you are requesting is not open
to you due to your on-going treatment with
Dr. Lauren Finley. . . and her
recommendation that you should not carry
a weapon while still under her care for the
next several months.” A204. Williams
then responded by requesting a radio room
assignment. PHA did not directly respond
to this request until litigation.
It is Williams’s position that with
the benefit of an accommodation transfer
he would have been able to perform the
essential functions of a member of the
radio room or the training unit. With
respect to the radio room, both sides agree
that, absent his inability to carry a firearm,
Williams was qualified for that position.
Indeed, PHA assigned him to that position
prior to receiving Dr. Finley’s report and
concluding that he could not be around
others carrying, or have access to,
firearms. Assuming a reasonable jury
concludes that Williams’s actual limitation
consisted of an inability to carry firearms,
there is nothing in the record to suggest
that Williams could not function in the
radio room without carrying a firearm. In
any event, PHA has not challenged, for
summ ary judgment pu rposes, that
Williams could have worked in the radio
room without carrying a firearm, and that
vacant, funded radio room positions were
available.

To the extent Williams relies upon
a “regarded as” theory of disability, PHA
contends that a plaintiff in Williams’s
position must show that there were vacant,
funded positions whose essential functions

12

Given PHA’s denial of Williams’s
request for a transfer to the training unit
based solely on Dr. Finley’s report, a
reasonable jury could also conclude that,
absent the inability to carry a weapon,
Williams was otherwise qualified to serve
in the training unit. Based on the extent of
Williams’s service with the PHA, we
believe a reasonable jury could infer that
his service in the training unit would not
necessarily require carrying a firearm.
20

the employee was capable of performing in
the eyes of the employer who misperceived
the employee’s limitations.13 Even if a
trier of fact concludes that PHA wrongly
perceived Williams’s limitations to be so
severe as to prevent him from performing
any law enforcement job, the “regarded
as” claim must, in PHA’s view, fail
because Williams has been unable to
demonstrate the existence of a vacant,
funded position at PHA whose functions
he was capable of performing in light of its
misperception. Williams could not have
been a “qualified individual” under the
ADA, PHA suggests, because there were
no jobs at this employer police station he
could have performed given its
misperception that he could not be around
others carrying, or have access to,
firearms. We reject this suggestion.

employee’s “regarded as” failure to
accommodate claim would always fail,
under PHA’s theory, because the employee
would never be able to demonstrate the
existence of any vacant, funded positions
he or she was capable of performing in the
eyes of the employer.
Pathmark soundly rejects an
argument similar to that here made by
PHA. There, an employer received a
medical report indicating that an employee
would have a significant “temporary”
i m p a i r m e nt, and th e e m pl oye r
misperceived the report, indicating to the
employee that it had “been advised your
restrictions are permanent,” id. at 184
(emphasis added). Viewing the employee
as suffering from severe, permanent
limitations as a result of what was in fact a
temporary impairment, the employer
supermarket concluded that the worker
“was unable to perform any Pathmark job,
even with accommodation,” id. at 188, and
fired the worker.

“[O]ne of the points of ‘regarded
as’ protection is that employers cannot
misinterpret information abou t an
employee’s limitations to conclude that the
employee is incapable of performing a
wide range [or class] of jobs.” Pathmark,
177 F.3d at 190. PHA’s argument, if
accepted, would make “regarded as”
protection meaningless. An employer
could simply regard an employee as
incapable of performing any work, and an

We agreed with the employee “that,
in general, an employer’s perception that
an employee cannot perform a wide range
[or class] of jobs suffices to make out a
‘regarded as’ claim.” Id. at 188. We held
that, with respect to the employee’s
“regarded as” claim, the employer would
be “liable if it wrongly regarded [the
employee] as so disabled that he could not
work and therefore denied him a job.” Id.
at 190. Anticipating PHA’s challenge
here, we held that “[i]f an employer
believes that a perceived disability
i n h e r e n t l y p r e c l u d es s u c c e s s fu l
performance of the essential functions of a

13

We assume for present purposes that
a jury determines that Williams’s actual
limitation was an inability to carry
firearms, and that PHA misperceived
Williams’s limitations when it concluded
that he was unable to have access to, or be
around others carrying, firearms.
21

job, with or without accommodation, the
employer must be correct about the
affected employee’s ability to perform the
job in order to avoid liability.” Id. at
193. 14
Thus, contrary to PHA’s

suggestion, a “regarded as” disabled
employee need not demonstrate during
litigation the availability of a position he
or she was capable of performing in the
eyes of the misperceiving employer.
To meet his litigation burden with
respect to both his “actual” and “regarded
as” disability claims, Williams need only
show

14

We also noted that “the law in this
circuit is that a ‘regarded as’ plaintiff can
make out a case [even] if the employer is
innocently wrong about the extent of his or
her impairment,” id. at 191, meaning that
there is no general “good faith” defense
available to PHA to the extent it
misperceived Williams as having an
impairment that substantially limits a
major life activity based upon myths, fears,
or stereotypes associated with disabilities.
There is, however, a limited defense
available to employers who engage in an
“individualized determination of the
employee’s actual condition” and develop
a misperception “based on the employee’s
unreasonable actions or omissions.” Id. at
193. Assuming a jury determines that
PHA misperceived Williams as being
unable to have access to, or be around
others carrying, firearms, the existence of
such a defense in this case would also be a
question for a jury, given that PHA
retained such a misperception despite
clarification from Dr. Finley that Williams
could be around others carrying firearms
and a communication from Williams
requesting a radio room assignment in
light of his having been cleared for such an
assignment by Dr. Finley.
Of course, while “an employer’s
innocent mistake (which may be a function
of ‘goofs’ or miscommunications) is

(1) that there was a vacant,
funded position; (2) that the
position was at or below the
level of the plaintiff’s
former job; and (3) that the
plaintiff was qualified to
perform the essential duties
of this job with reasonable
accommodation.
If the
employee meets his burden,
t h e e m p l o ye r m u st
demonstrate
that

sufficient to subject it to liability under the
ADA,” the “employer’s state of mind
[remains] relevant to the appropriate
remedies.”
Id. at 182-83 (citation
omitted); see 42 U.S.C. 1981a(a)(3)
(where “discriminatory practice involves
t h e p r o v i s io n o f a r e a s o na b l e
accommodation,” “damages may not be
awarded . . . where the covered entity
demonstrates good faith efforts, in
consultation with [employee], to identify
and make a reasonable accommodation”);
see also Deane, 142 F.3d at 148 n.12
(“regarded as” plaintiff “might be entitled
to injunctive relief against future
discrimination”).
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t r a n s f e r ri n g t h e
e m p l o ye e w o u l d
cause unreasonable
hardship.

C. Adverse Employment Action
Resulting From Discrimination
As we have noted, a failure to make
a reasonable accommodation for a disabled
and qualified employee constitutes
discrimination under the ADA. Taylor,
184 F.3d at 306. Williams claims that
P H A f a i le d t o m a k e su c h a n
accommodation when it refused his
requests for assignment to the radio room
and the training unit. In addition to
insisting that Williams was not disabled,
PHA seems to suggest that it offered to
reasonably accommodate Williams by
offering him an unpaid leave of absence
and future employment should he recover.
“[T]he question of whether a proposed
accommodation is reasonable is a question
of fact.” Buskirk, 307 F.3d at 170; see
also Skerski, 257 F.3d at 286; cf. Walton v.
Mental Health Ass’n of Southeastern Pa.,
168 F.3d 661, 671 (3d Cir. 1999) (“unpaid
leave supplementing regular sick and
personal days might, under [some] facts,
represent a reasonable accommodation”).
If a trier of fact concludes that Williams
was disabled, however, it could also find
that the failure to continue Williams’ paid
employment as a member of the radio or
training unit was a failure to reasonably

Donahue v. Consol. Rail Corp., 224 F.3d
226, 230 (3d Cir. 2000). Williams alleges,
and the record supports a finding, that a
radio room assignment was available, that
the position was at or below his level, and
that he was qualified to perform the
essential duties of that job with no further
accommodation.
Thus, Williams has
established that there is a material dispute
of fact as to whether he was a qualified
individual under the ADA.15
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We are, of course, aware that “an
employer is not required to provide a
reasonable accommodation if it . . . would
pose a ‘direct threat’ to the safety of the
employee or others, 29 C.F.R. §
1630.15(b)(2), see Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, [78-79], 122 S.Ct.
2045, 2049, 153 L.Ed.2d 82 (2002).”
Buskirk v. Apollo Metals, 307 F.3d 160,
168 (3d Cir. 2002); see also 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(r) (defining “direct threat”). PHA
has not argued, for summary judgment
purposes, that Williams was not entitled to
reasonable accommodation under the
“direct threat” exemption, and has instead
focused its efforts on whether Williams
was disabled and/or a qualified individual.
Having concluded that there is a
material dispute of fact as to whether
Williams was disabled and a qualified
individual, we mention the “direct threat”
exemption here only to make clear that the
ADA is not unsympathetic to employers

faced with an employee who truly poses a
“direct threat” to workplace safety. Here,
of course, there is a triable issue of fact as
to whether Williams posed such a “direct
threat,” given that PHA’s refusal to allow
Williams to work around others with
firearms was contrary to the conclusion of
its own clinician.
23

accommodate and accordingly constituted
an adverse employment action under the
ADA.

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3). Further,
The EEOC’s interpretive
guidelines establish the
circumstances that trigger
the employer’s duty to
engage in this interactive
process: “Once a qualified
individual with a disability
has requested provision of a
reasonable accommodation,
the employer must make a
reaso nable effort to
determine the appropriate
acco mm odatio n. The
a ppr o priate rea s o n a b le
accommodation is best
de te r mine d thro ugh a
flexible, interactive process
that involves both the
employer
and
the
[employee] with a
disability.”

Additionally, we have repeatedly
held that an employer has a duty under the
ADA to engage in an “interactive process”
of communication with an employee
requesting an accommodation so that the
employer will be able to ascertain whether
there is in fact a disability and, if so, the
extent thereof, and thereafter be able to
a s s i s t i n i d e n ti f yi n g r e a s o n ab le
accommodations where appropriate. “The
ADA itself does not refer to the interactive
process,” but does require employers to
“make reasonable accommodations” under
some circumstances for qualifie d
individuals. Shapiro v. Township of
Lakewood, 292 F.3d 356, 359 (3d Cir.
2002) (internal quotation marks and
alterations omitted). With respect to what
consists of a “reasonable accommodation,”
EEOC regulations indicate that,

Jones v. United Parcel Serv., 214 F.3d
402, 407 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting 29 C.F.R.
Pt. 1630, App. § 1630.9).

[t]o
determ ine
the
a p propriate r e a s o nable
accommodation it may be
necessary for the covered
entity to initiate an informal,
interactive process with the
qualified individual with a
disability in need of the
accommodation.
This
process should identify the
precise limitations resulting
from the disability and
p o t e n t ia l r e a s o n a b l e
accommodations that could
overcome those limitations.

Accordingly, we have held that both
employer and employee “have a duty to
assist in the search for appropriate
reasonable accommodation and to act in
good faith.” Mengine, 114 F.3d at 420
(discussing the duty in the context of the
Rehabilitation Act). An employee can
demonstrate that an employer breached its
duty to provide re asonable
accommodations because it failed to
engage in good faith in the interactive
process by showing that:
1) the employer knew about
24

t h e emp lo y e e’s
disability; 2) the
employee requested
accommodations or
assistance for his or
her disability; 3) the
employer did not
make a good faith
effort to assist the
employee in seeking
a c c o m m o d a t i o n s;
and 4) the employee
could have been
r e a s o n a b l y
accommodated but
for the employer’s
lack of good faith.

conclude that PHA knew about his
disa bility, that he reque sted
accommodation, that PHA’s quite limited
response to his training unit assignment
request was not made in good faith, that
PHA’s offer of extended unpaid leave was
not a good faith response to his request for
a radio room assignment, and that
Williams could have been reasonably
accommodated with a radio room or
training unit assignment but for PHA’s
lack of good faith. Thus, a material
dispute of fact exists as to whether PHA
failed to engage in good faith in the
interactive process, thereby failing to
reasonably accommodate Williams.16

Taylor, 184 F.3d at 319-20. However, in
addressing an employee’s claim that an
employer failed to engage in the
interactive process, we have also made
clear that a “plaintiff in a disability
discrimination case who claims that the
defendant engaged in discrimination by
f a i l in g t o m a k e a r e a s o n ab l e
accommodation cannot recover without
showing that a reasonable accommodation
was possible.” Donahue, 224 F.3d at 234.
Thus, “‘because employers have a duty to
help the disabled employee devise
accommodations, an employer who acts in
bad faith in the interactive process will be
liable if the jury can reasonably conclude
that the employee would have been able to
perform the job with accommodations.’”
Id. at 234-35 (quoting Taylor, 184 F.3d at
317) (emphasis in original).

16

Our admonition en banc in Deane that
employers take seriously the interactive
process rings true in this case. There, we
noted that a single phone call between an
employer and an employee “hardly
satisfies our standard that the employer
make reasonable efforts to assist the
employee, to communicate with him in
good faith, and to not impede his
investigation for employment.” Deane,
142 F.3d at 149. PHA’s initial response to
Williams’s request for a training unit
assignment did little to meet its obligation
to interact in good faith. Compare A204
(“it is the position of this police
department that the specific position that
you are requesting is not open to you due
to your on-going treatment with Dr.
Lauren Finley. . . and her recommendation
that you should not carry a weapon while
still under her care for the next several
months.”) with Taylor, 184 F.3d at 317

Under Taylor, Williams has
demonstrated that a fact-finder could
25

V. “Regarded As” Employees and the
Right to Reasonable Accommodation

that is one of first impression in this
Circuit and has occasioned a circuit split
elsewhere. We assume for purposes of our
analysis that the trier of fact will find
erroneous PHA’s perception that
Williams’s depression prevented him from
being around others carrying, or having
access to, guns.

To the extent Williams relies upon
a claim that PHA perceived his impairment
to be greater than it was, PHA advances an
additional argument. It insists that a
“regarded as” disabled employee is not
entitled to accommodation under the ADA
and that, accordingly, Williams suffered
no adverse employment action other than
his termination.17 This presents an issue

Based on the statutory text and the
legislative history of the ADA, the First
Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a
“regarded as” disabled employee is
entitled to be accommodated. Katz v. City
Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 1996).
The better-reasoned district court decisions
reach the same result. See Jacques v.
DiMarzio, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 151, 16371 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); Jewell v. Reid’s
Confectionary Co., 172 F. Supp. 2d 212,
218-19 (D. Me. 2001); see also Lorinz v.
Turner Const. Co., 2004 WL 1196699, *8
n.7 (E.D.N.Y. May 25, 2004) (endorsing
Jacques); Miller v. Heritage Prod., Inc.,
2004 WL 1087370, *10 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 21,
2004) (same). We also find Judge Block’s

(“Employers can show their good faith in
a number of ways, such as taking steps like
the following: meet with the employee
who requests an accommodation, request
information about the condition and what
limitations the employee has, ask the
employee what he or she specifically
wants, show some sign of having
considered employee’s request, and offer
and discuss available alternatives when the
request is too burdensome”).
PHA’s subsequent failure to
respond to Williams’s request for a radio
room assignment further subjected it to the
risk that it overlooked an opportunity to
accommodate a statutorily disabled
employee. See Taylor, 184 F.3d at 317
(“[A]n employer who fails to engage in the
interactive process runs a serious risk that
it will erroneously overlook an opportunity
to accommodate a statutorily disabled
employee, and thereby violate the ADA.”).

nonetheless be required to remand this
matter for further proceedings based upon
the existence of a material dispute of fact
with respect to Williams’s actual
disability. If a jury finds Williams to have
been actually disabled because his
depression deprived him of the ability to
carry a firearm, as we discuss supra note
14, liability could be imposed even though
P H A denied his requests for
accommodation based on its misperception
regarding the extent of Williams’s
impairment.

17

Even if we were to agree with PHA
that “regarded as” disabled individuals are
not entitled to reasonable accommodations
under the ADA, we note that we would
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analysis in Jacques particularly persuasive,
and will largely track his approach below.

917. In Kaplan, the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, despite finding that “on
its face, the ADA’s definition of ‘qualified
individual with a disability’ does not
differentiate between the three alternative
prongs of the ‘disability definition,’” 323
F.3d at 1232, adopted the rationale of
Weber, again suggesting that a “formalistic
reading” of the ADA would lead to
“bizarre results.” Id. Specifically, Kaplan
endorsed the “windfall theory” suggested
in a dictum by our Court: “it seems odd to
give an impaired but not disabled person a
windfall because of her employer’s
erroneous perception of disability, when
other impaired but not disabled people are
not e ntitle d to accommodati o n .”
Pathmark, 177 F.3d at 196 (citing Deane,
142 F.3d at 149 n.12).

As PHA stresses, however, there
are two Courts of Appeals who have
reasoned to a contrary conclusion, see
Kaplan v. City of North Las Vegas, 323
F.3d 1226, 1231-33 (9th Cir. 2003); Weber
v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 916-17 (8th
Cir. 1999), and two have so concluded
without analysis, see Workman v. FritoLay, Inc., 165 F.3d 460, 467 (6th Cir.
1999); Newberry v. East Texas State
University, 161 F.3d 276, 280 (5th Cir.
1998). 18 We find ourselves unpersuaded
by the reasoning of Weber and Kaplan.
Weber acknowledged that the
statutory text did not distinguish between
actually and “regarded as” disabled
employees. It declined to apply the statute
as written, however, because doing so, in
its view, “would lead to bizarre results.”
186 F.3d at 916. In so concluding, it
declined to attribute to Congress an intent
“to create a disparity among impaired but
non-disabled employees, denying most the
right to reasonable accommodations but
granting to others, because of the
employers’ misperceptions, a right to
reasonable accommodations. . . .” Id. at

While we do not rule out the
possibility that there may be situations in
w h i c h a p p l yi n g t h e re a s o n a b le
accommodation requirement in favor of a
“regarded as” disabled employee would
produce “bizarre results,” we perceive no
basis for an across-the-board refusal to
apply the ADA in accordance with the
plain meaning of its text. Here, and in
what seem to us to be at least the vast
majority of cases, a literal reading of the
Act will not produce such results.
Accordingly, we will remain faithful to its
directive in this case.

18

Three Circuit Courts, including our
own, have thus far considered but declined
to address the issue. See Cameron v.
Cmty. Aid For Retarded Children, Inc.,
335 F.3d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 2003); Mack v.
Great Dane Trailers, 308 F.3d 776, 783
n.2 (7th Cir. 2002); Buskirk, 307 F.3d at
168-69 & n.2.

A. The Plain Language of the ADA
As we have heretofore explained,
the ADA makes it unlawful for a covered
employer to “discriminate against a
qualified individual with a disability
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because of the disability,” 42 U.S.C. §
12112(a), and “discrimination” in this
context includes, with an exception not
here relevant, “not making reasonable
accommodation to the . . . mental
limitations of an otherwise qualified
individual with a disability,” 42 U.S.C. §
12112(b)(5)(A).
The definition of
“disability” includes “being regarded as
having . . . an impairment” that
substantially limits a major life activity.
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C) (emphasis
added). Thus, as all would agree, the
statutory text of the ADA does not in any
way “distinguish between [actually]
disabled and ‘regarded as’ individuals in
requiring accommodation.” Pathmark,
177 F.3d at 196.

could
nevertheless
substantially limit that
person’s ability to work as a
result of the negative
reactions of others to the
impairment.”
The Court concluded
that, by including this test,
“Congress acknowledged
accumulated myths and
fears about disability and
diseases are as handicapping
a s a r e t h e p h ys i c al
limitations that flow from
actual impairment.”
Thus, a person who
[suffers a n adve rse
employment action] because
of the myths, fears and
stereotypes associated with
d i s a b il i t ie s w o u l d b e
covered under [the
“regarded a s” prong],
whether or no t the
employer’s perception was
shared by others in the field
and whether or not the
person’s physical or mental
c o n d i t io n w o u l d b e
considered a disability under
the first or second part of
the definition.

B. The Legislative History
Moreover, the legislative history of
the ADA confirms that Congress meant
what its text says. As Congress explained:
[The objective of the
“regarded as” provision of
the ADA] was articulated by
the Supreme Court in
School Board of Nassau
County v. Arline. The Court
noted that although an
individual may have an
impairment that does not in
fact substantially limit a
major life activity, the
reaction of others may prove
just as disabling. “Such an
impairment mig ht n ot
diminish a person’s physical
or mental capabilities, but

H.R. Rep. No. 101-485 (III), 1990
U.S .C.C.A.N. 445, 453 (footnotes
omitted). Thus, the ADA was written to
protect one who is “disabled” by virtue of
being “regarded as” disabled in the same
way as one who is “disabled” by virtue of
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being “actually disabled,” because being
perceived as disabled “may prove just as
disabling.” This case demonstrates the
wisdom of that conclusion, in that but for
PHA’s erroneous perception that Williams
was unable to be around firearms because
of his mental impairment, Williams would
have been eligible for a radio room
assignment.

no actual incapacity at all.’” Arline, 480
U.S. at 279 (quoting Southeastern Cmty.
Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 405-406 n.6
(1979)) (alterations in original). The Court
held that the teacher plaintiff, who had a
contagious but not substantially limiting
form of tuberculosis, fell into this
category. It found that employers had “an
affirmative obligation [u nder the
Rehabilitation Act] to make a reasonable
accommodation” for such an employee,
Arline, 480 U.S. at 289 n.19, and
remanded so that the District Court could
determine “whether the School Board
could have reasonably accommodated
her,” id. at 288-89.

C. The Supreme Court’s Decision in
Arline
In addition to the statutory text and
legislative history, the Supreme Court’s
decision in School Board of Nassau
County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987),
also requires that “regarded as” employees
be entitled to reasonable accommodations.
Arline involved a claim based on the
Rehabilitation Act. The Court pointed out
that the Act’s definition of “handicapped
individual” had been amended to read as
follows:

Given that the “regarded as”
sections of both Acts play a virtually
identical role in the statutory scheme, and
the well-established rule that the ADA
must be read “to grant at least as much
protection as provided by . . . the
Rehabilitation Act,” Bragdon v. Abbott,
524 U.S. 624, 632 (1998), the conclusion
seems inescapable that “regarded as”
employees under the ADA are entitled to
reasonable accommodation in the same
way as are those who are actually disabled.
Of course, additionally, Congress
specifically endorsed the Arline approach
in crafting the “regarded as” prong of the
ADA’s definition of “disability.” Neither
the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Weber nor
the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Kaplan
address Arline.

[A]ny person who (i) has a
ph ysical or men tal
impairment
which
substantially limits one or
more of such person’s major
life activities, (ii) has a
record of such an
impairment, or (iii) is
regarded as having such an
impairment.
Arline, 480 U.S. at 279. The Court
explained that this expansion of the
definition was intended “to preclude
discrimination against ‘[a] person who has
a record of, or is regarded as having, an
impairment [but who] may at present have

D. The “Windfall” Proposition
PHA, arguing the windfall theory to
our Court, suggests that Williams, by
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being “regarded as” disabled by PHA,
receives a “windfall” accommodation
compared to a similarly situated employee
who had not been “regarded as” disabled
and would not be entitled under the ADA
to any accommodation. The record in this
case demonstrates that, absent PHA’s
erroneous perception that Williams could
not be around firearms because of his
mental impairment, a radio room
assignment would have been made
available to him and others similarly
situated. PHA refused to provide that
assignment solely based upon its erroneous
perception that W illiams’s mental
impairment prevented him not only from
carrying a gun, but being around others
with, or having access to, guns –
perceptions specifically contradicted by
PHA’s own psychologist.
While a
similarly situated employee who was not
perceived to have this additional limitation
would have been allowed a radio room
assignment, Williams was specifically
denied such an assignment because of the
erroneous perception of his disability. The
employee whose limitations are perceived
accurately gets to work, while Williams is
sent home unpaid. This is precisely the
type of discrimination the “regarded as”
prong literally protects from, as confirmed
by the Supreme Court’s decision in Arline
and the legislative history of the ADA.
Accordingly, Williams, to the extent PHA
regarded him as disabled, was entitled to
reasonable accommodation.19

that the employee did not have or
limitations greater than the employee’s
actual limitations, a simple reasonable
accommodation can be devised to allow
the employee to continue working even
given the employer’s misperception. In
such cases, it may be that the employer and
employee never reach a meeting of the
minds, regardless of who was at fault for
failing to do so, as to the employee’s
actual limitations.
Nonetheless, the
employee can still be reasonably
accommodated such that he or she can
perform the essential functions of the
position even in light of the employer’s
misperception. For example, an employer
supermarket requires all of its cashiers to
stand. One cashier has a back problem
that causes discomfort but does not
amount to an actual disability. The
employer misperceives this back problem
as one that prevents the employee from
standing for more than an hour, and fires
the employee because she cannot stand.
Even if the supermarket and cashier never
reach a meeting of the minds as to the true
extent of the cashier’s limitations, the
supermarket might, assuming its erroneous
perception amounted to a substantial
limitation of a major life activity, be
required to reasonably accommodate such
a “regarded as” disabled employee by, for
example, providing a stool.
In our case, it is true that PHA
perceived Williams’s limitations to be so
extensive that no simple solution, such as
a stool, would have allowed Williams to
keep working while their misperception

19

In many cases where an employer
regards an employee as having limitations
30

summary judgment. 20

VI. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will
reverse and remand the District Court’s
grant of summary judgment in favor of
PHA with respect to Williams’s ADA and
PHRA discrimination claims. We will
affirm the District Court’s summary
judgment determination with respect to
Williams’s retaliation claims and with
respect to Williams’s cross-motion for

20

Williams also appeals the District
Court’s denial of partial summary
judgment in his favor with respect to
whether he is disabled, whether PHA
breached its duty to engage in the
interactive process, and whether PHA
failed to provide Williams with a
reasonable accommodation.
Williams
argues, inter alia, that PHA “admitted” he
was disabled within the meaning of the
ADA by offering him the opportunity to
take an unpaid leave of absence, thereby
“accommodating” him.
We agree with the Sixth and Ninth
Circuits, however, that an offer of
accommodation does not, by itself,
establish that an employer “regarded” an
employee as disabled. See Thornton v.
McClatchy Newspapers, Inc., 261 F.3d
789, 798 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[W]hen an
employer takes steps to accommodate an
employee’s restrictions, it is not thereby
conceding that the employee is disabled
under the ADA or that it regards the
employee as disabled. A contrary rule
would discourage the amicable resolution
of numerous employment disputes and
needlessly force parties into expensive and
time-consuming litigation.”), clarified in
other respects, 292 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir.
2002); Plant v. Morton Int’l, Inc., 212 F.3d
929, 938 (6th Cir. 2000) (“The intent
behind this [“regarded as”] provision,
according to the EEOC, is to reach those
cases in which ‘myths, fears and
stereotypes’ affect the employer’s
treatment of an individual. [An employee]

persisted. Thus, it was critical that PHA
engage in good faith in the interactive
process and determine the actual extent of
Williams’s limitations before simply
deeming him unable to work, contrary to
the opinion of their own psychologist.
Instead, as we have indicated, PHA’s
response (or lack thereof) to Williams’s
disability has created a material dispute of
fact as to whether it failed to engage in
good faith in the interactive process.
Assuming a jury determines that PHA’s
perception was inaccurate and that it
regarded Williams as disabled, it is PHA’s
insistence on this erroneous perception and
failure to discuss with Williams the true
extent of his actual limitations that, as we
have explained, potentially amounts to a
failure to engage in the interactive process
and, thereby, a failure to reasonably
accommodate. Accordingly, even where
an employer mistakenly regards an
employee as so disabled that the employee
cannot work at all, the employer still must
accommodate a “regarded as” employee by
seeking to determine, in good faith, the
extent of the employee’s actual limitations.
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cannot show that this provision applies to
him merely by pointing to that portion of
the record in which his [employer]
admitted that he was aware of [the
employee’s] medical restrictions and
modified [the employee’s] responsibilities
based on them.”).
Williams further argues that there is
no material dispute of fact with respect to
all of the preceding issues. However, as
we have indicated, there are factual
determinations to be made with respect to
each of these issues.
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